

Message Text

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SUBJECT: SIAD, THE SOVIETS, AND THEIR COMMON INTERNAL PROBLEMS
IN SOMALIA.

REF: A) MOGADISCIO 621 B) MOGADISCIO 521 C) MOGADISCIO 437
D) MOGADISCIO 422

1. ALTHOUGH VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF ANTI-SIAD ACTIVITY HAS NOW PASSED
FROM MOGADISCIO POLITICAL SCENE -- TRACTS, WALL SCRAWLINGS AND
ARRESTS -- AND MOGADISCIO POLITICAL LIFE OUTWARDLY CALM, WE
BELIEVE THAT SIAD'S PROBLEMS NEVERTHELESS REMAIN.

2. FOR MEMENT, SIAD HAS PAPERED OVER HIS PROBLEMS WITH HIS VICE
PRESIDENTS -- GENERAL SAMANTAR AND ABOCAR IN PARTICULAR -- BOTH
OF WHOM HAVE REASSUMED WORK. WE INFORMED BY RELIABLE DIPLOMATIC
SOURCE THAT SIAD MET WITH GENERAL SAMANTAR AND ABOCAR IN EARLY
APRIL AND TOLD THEM HE WOULD FORGET DIFFERENCES AND THEIR
MANEUVERING AGAINST HIM IN RETURN FOR RENEWED SUPPORT. BOTH MEN
REPORTEDLY AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH SIAD. ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS RENEWAL OF PUBLIC SOLIDARITY AT TOP OF SRC RANKS.

3. MOST CONSPICUOUS PUBLIC SIGN OF SIAD/SAMANTAR RECONCILIATION
TOOK PLACE AT 15TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF SNA, WHERE SAMANTAR
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MADE MAJOR ADDRESS. SAMANTAR HAS SINCE RETURNED TO HIS TOP SPOT

IN MINDEFENSE, A POSITION HE HAD VACTED DURING MUCH OF MARCH WHEN HE WITHDREW TO MILITARY HOSPITAL FOLLOWING REPORTS THAT HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN POLOT AGAINST SIAD. SNA VICE COMMANDANT FADIL RAN MINDEFENSE DURING SAMANTAR: ABSENCE. EGQ UIAN MIL ATTACHE NASR-EL-DIN CALLED ON SAMANTAR AT MINDEFENSE APRIL 22 FOR FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL MONTHS AND REPORTS SAMANTAR IS BACK IN FULL COMMAND.

4. VICE PRES. ABOCAR ALSO REAPPEARED IN EARLY APRIL AFTER SEVERAL WEEKS IN SHADOWS AND HAS BEGUN WHERE HE LEFT OFF AS VIGOUOUS SPOKESMAN FOR SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM. VICE PRES. CULMIE HAS ALSO RETURNED TO PUBLIC LIFE AFTER SEVERAL WEEKS CONFINEMENT AT HOME.

5. SIAD EVIDENTLY FELT SUFFICIENTLY ENCOURAGED BY THE RECONCILIATION TO TOUR DROUGHT AREAS DURING APRIL, HIS MOST LENGTHY ABSENCE FROM MOGADISCIO SINCE LATE 1974. WHILE HE WAS GONE, SRC VICE PRESIDENTS HANDLED STICKY ARAB SUMMIT PROBLEM AND DISPATCHED ABOCAR TO CAIRO TO LOBBY FOR ARAB SUPPORT FOR MOGADISCIO VENUE.

6. IN MEANTIME, MOHAMED ADEN AND WEIRAH REMAIN IN JAIL AND HERSI RECEIVED STIFF FIFTEEN YR SENTENCE FOR QTE NEPOTISM UNTTE ON APRIL 21. ALL THREE ARE FOR TIME BEING FORGOTTEN MEN AND IF THEY HAD ANY SPECIAL STATUS AS POLITICAL IDEOLOGUES, NO ONE NOW SEEMS TO REMEMBER.

7. INTERPRETATIONS STILL VARY AS TO WHAT OCCURRED BEHIND SCENES IN MARCH. SO DO RUMORS. EGYPTIAN MILITARY ATTACHE NASR EL-DIN, AS WELL AS SOME ARAB DIPLOMATS, BELIEVE MUCH OF DIFFICULTY WAS INVOKED BY SOVIETS, WHO WERE ATTEMPTING BOTH BY DIRECT AND INDIRECT MEANS TO TELL SIAD THAT HIS GROWING INDEPENDENCE VIS-A-VIS MOSCOW WAS DANGEROUS COURSE FOR HIM. ARABS BELIEVE SOVIETS UNEASY ABOUT SIAD'S GROWING ACCOMMODATION WITH ARAB LEAGUE MEMBERS. NASR-EL-DIN BELIEVES SIAD GOT MESSAGE, PULLED BACK AND IS NOW FIRMLY REESTABLISHED IN SOVIET ORBIT. HE HAS REPORTED TO CAIRO THAT ARAB CRESCENT NOW IN FULL ECLIPSE IN SOMALIA AND EGYPTIANS AND ALL OTHER ARABS SHOULD BIDE THEIR TIME.

8. WE DO NOT RPT NOT FULLY CREDIT THIS LINE. WHILE SIAD'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS SINCE EARLY APRIL (MOGADISCIO 521) SUPPORT CONCLUSION
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THAT HE HAS BECOME MORE RIGIDLY DOCTRINAIRE IN FOLLOWING SOVIET LINE, WE BELIEVE SIAD'S RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW ARE NOT RPT NOT FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE AND THAT SIAD IS NOW AND HAS BEEN FOR SOME TIME IN FULL SUPPORT OF SOVIET POLICY (MOG 526).

9. WE BELIEVE THAT BASIC PROBLEM WHICH HAS BEEN CONFJONTING SIAD AND SOVIETS SINCE MARCH IS SIAD'S ABILITY TO SURVICE INTERNAL

OPPOSITION TO HIS PERSONAL RULE OVER SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM. WHILE IT IS BY NO MEANS CRYSTAL CLEAR TO US WHO WERE PRINCIPALS INVOLVED IN MARCH PLOT-MAKING, WE ARE PERSUADED THAT (A) A POWER-STRUGGLE TOOK PLACE; (B) THAT HIGH RANKING SRC MEMBERS PROBABLY WERE INVOLVED (I.E., SAMANTAR AND ABOCAR); AND (C) THAT THE SOVIETS WERE WELL AWARE OF IT. NAMES ARE FOR MOMENT LESS IMPORTANT THAN CHANGE IN ATMOSPHERE BEHIND SCENES AND WE CONCLUDE THAT SINCE FEBRUARY THERE HAS BEEN GROWING REALIZATION IN SRC, IN GSDF, AND WITH SOVIETS THAT SIAD IS VULNERABLE.

10. WE TRACE BEGINNING OF SIAD'S VULNERABILITY TO HIS JANUARY DECISION TO EXECUTE SHEIKHS -- A DECISION WHICH MANY SRC MEMBERS FOUND DEEPLY DISTURBING, WHICH CUT ACROSS POLITICAL AND TRIBAL LINES AND HAD PROFOUND REPERCUSSIONS AMONG SOMALI PEOPLE. THERE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT SIAD CAN NEVER AGAIN BE SECURE FROM CONSEQUENCES OF THIS BLOOD-LETTING, REGARDLESS OF HOW LONG HE REMAINS IN POWER. IN ADDITION TO SHEIKH AFFAIR, SOMALIA HAS FACED INCREASING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, DROUGHT, FOOD SCARCITY, RISING PRICES AND VARIETY OF OTHER AILMENTS WHICH HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED CHARACTER AND QUALITY OF SOMALI LIFE OVER PAST TWELVE MONTHS. THESE PROBLEMS HAVE BECOME IDENTIFIED WITH SIAD'S PERSONAL RULE.

1. WE SUSPECT THAT IN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH, SOME SRC MEMBERS AND OTHERS READ PUBLIC MOOD AND BEGAN FOR FIRST TIME TO LOOK BEYOND SIAD'S RULE AND TO MANEUVER ACCORDINGLY. EXTENT TO WHICH SAMANTAR, ABOCAR AND OTHERS WERE PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN UNKNOWN. WE ARE ALSO UNCLEAR AS TO WEIRAH OR MOHAMMEDHAGDEN'S POSITION IN POWER STRUGGLE.

12. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT SOVIETS TOO WERE WELL AWARE OF SIAD'S GROWING UNPOPULARITY, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH RAISED NUMBER OF DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FOR THEM. SOVIETS WOULD PREFER SUPPORT SIAD
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OVER ALL OTHERS BUT, IF SIAD CONTROL OF INTERNAL SCENE BEGINS TO CRUMBLE, WHILE HIS PERSONAL POPULARITY CONTINUES TO REMAIN LOW, THEY THEY TOO MUST CONSIDER THEIR OPTIONS. WHILE WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT SOVIETS WERE THEMSELVES INVOLVED IN MARCH MANEUVERING, WE DO NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OF PLOTTERS -- PERHAPS IN SNA -- HOPED TO MAKE SOVIETS HOSTAGE TO THEIR INITIATIVE. FACT THAT INTERNAL MANEUVERING WAS TAKING PLACE MUST HAVE BEEN DISTURBING SIGN FOR SOVIETS AS WELL AS FOR SIAD.

13. WHATEVER ROLE SOVIETS PLAYED IN MARCH EVENTS, IT SEEMS CLEAR NOW THAT SINCE EARLY APRIL, SOVIETS HAVE MADE SPECIAL EFFORT TO SHOW SNA, SRC AND ALL OTHERS THAT THEY SOLIDLY SUPPORT SIAD. SINCE END OF MARCH, FIVE SOVIET POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL GROUPS HAVE SWIFTLY DESCENDED ON MOGADISCIO. AT

APRIL 11 CELEBRATION OF 15TH ANNIVERSARY OF SOMALI ARMY, SIAD AND SAMANTAR SHOWED TO ASSEMBLED SNA OFFICERS CORPS THAT THEIR PERSONAL DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN OVERCOME. THIRD MOST CONSPICUOUS OFFICIAL ON SCENE WAS SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAMSONOV, WHO PLAYED RINGMASTER AND SAT WITH SIAD AND SAMANTAR (TO FURY OF ARAB ENVOYS, WHO WERE PLACED WELL BELOW SALT). WE CONCLUDE THAT APRIL 12 SHOW WAS A SOVIET STAGED COUP DE THEATRE -- WITH PROTRAIT OF BREZHNEV LOOKING ON -- INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SOVIET/SIAD RELATIONS SOLID AS EVZR, AND THAT SAMANTAR WAS BACK CN SIAD'S GOOD GRACES.

14. WE DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER HIS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE RECONCILIATION WITH SRC OR OTHERS MARKS END OF SIAD'S PROBLEMS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SIAD'S MOST OBSESSIVE FEAR AT PRESENT IS FEAR OF ASSASSINATION, THAT HIS RESIDENCE ON MILITARY COMPOUND HAS BECOME AN ARSENAL, AND THAT HIS FAGULY HAS TERRIBLE FEARS FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETLY. SOVIETS HOWEVER CAN READ THESE SIGNS BETTER THAN WE AND FOR TIME BEING THEY SEEM TO BE DOING WHAT THEY CAN TO MAKE HIS POSITION AS SUCURE AS IT ONCE WAS. WE DO NOT RPT NOT THINK IT IS.
HAMRICK

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